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The liberalization attempts in the early 1980's in Eastern 
European countries attracted western car manufacturers. Thus for 
example, the Japanese Daihatsu began negotiations in Poland while 
Suzuki targeted Hungary. However, owing to the longer local 
involvement of Fiat and a stronger governmental backing behind it, 
Fiat won and Daihatsu failed to get the deal [10]. On the other 
hand, Suzuki, though after long negotiations, established a joint 
venture car assembly factory in Hungary which is up to date the 
largest Japanese direct investment in Eastern Europe. During the 
first year of its operation Magyar Suzuki successfully developed 
the network of Hungarian subcontractors by inviting Suzuki's 
Japanese partners to help them upgrade. Exports were also started 
in 1993. 
The Market 
Although the potential Hungarian automobile market may seem 
small because Hungary's population is only 10 million, it is really 
quite substantial as the result of the need for a quick renewal of 
Hungary's aged car stock. The average age of Hungarian cars is 
roughly 10 years and roughly 1 million of Hungary's 3 million cars 
ought to be immediately replaced because they are more than 10 
20(130) ffi 39 ~ ffi 2 % 
years old or have a high-polluting 2-stroke engine. In 1990 about 
40 percent of all Hungarian cars, including Trabant and Wartburg 
made in the former GDR, had a 2-stroke engine and their share 
did not decrease substantially even after many western used cars 
were imported as a result of car import liberalization in 1989-1990 
[7]. 
Hungary's high demand for automobiles is also demonstrated 
by import data. In 1989 car imports totalled 204. 345 of which 
136. 280 (67 percent) were imported by state car trading companies 
and 68. 065 (33 percent) were imported by private individuals. In 
1989, imports by private individuals were particularly high as a 
result of the temporarily low import duty of only 10 percent. 
However, even in 1990, when the import duty rose to 35 percent, 
30 thousand cars were imported by tourists. 
In 1992 36, 000 new cars were sold in Hungary, by the end of 
1993 this figure reached 45,000. Anyway, earlier estimations for 
the Hungarian market in the range of 120 to 140 thousand cars 
have not come true yet. Suzuki's management is considering boost-
ing production to 50 thousand cars by 1995, of which half could be 
sold in Hungary and half in Western Europe. 
The world market strategy of Suzuki is to establish regional 
manufacturing and marketing centres for its various products. 
Three categories of car are in play. The mini Maruti is produced 
in India. The subcompact category Swift and the bigger sedan 
version will be made in Hungary. The third type, an off-road 
vehicle is the product of the Santana factory in Spain. 
Until recently, Suzuki's main office maintained a marketing 
strategy of supplying Western Europe by cars made in Japan while 
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to sell the Hungarian made cars in Hungary and the Eastern 
region. From 1994 this strategy has been basically changed: Suzuki 
wants to supply Europe from the Hungarian factory (in 1993 
altogether 60 thousand Suzuki cars were sold in Europe) [15]. 
Capital Sharing and Conditions 
The agreement was negotiated almost 10 years long and finally 
it was signed in 1990. 
The basic agreement with Suzuki specifies that the five door 
model of the Suzuki Swift, with both a 1 and 1, 3 liter engine will 
be produced beginning from 1992. An output of 15 thousand is 
planned for 1992 with production reaching 50 thousand by 1995 and 
eventually reaching later a maximum of 100 thousand per year. 
The Magyar Suzuki was founded in April 1991 with US$ 70 
million, then, after production started, capital was increased by 
another US$ 90 million in December 1993. 
Table 1 Capital sharing 
Total project value: $ 
Japanese share: of which 
Suzuki 40% 
C. Itoh 11% 
Hungarian share: Autokonszern 
International Finance Corporation 
1991 
70 million 
51% 
49.9% 
15.6% 
40% 
9% 
100% 
1993 
160 million 
65.5% 
30.2% 
4.3% 
100% 
In the initial figures (1991) Suzuki's share is somewhat overrepre-
sented because in reality 20 percent of its share is contributed in 
22(132) ffi 2 % 
the form of foregone licence fees. 
After the project was opened, some financial troubles appeared 
mainly due to changes in exchange rates. As Suzuki imported car 
parts from Japan and took a yen-credit, it is quite understandable 
that exchange rate impacts were felt quite strongly. In 1993 the 
Japanese yen was overvalued, the Hungarian forint was devalued 
which meant a double-negative impact [13]. For instance, the 
Yen 17 billion loan equaled at the beginning a Ft 9 billion but as 
a result of new exchange rates this repayment burden grew to 15 
billion. In addition, one more new car type, the Sedan was introduced 
into production which required additional investment. Therefore, 
mainly in order to escape from the grip of yen-credit, Suzuki 
decided a considerable capital increase which was realized in 
December 1993 primarily with Japanese contribution. After this 
the Japanese share increased from 40% to 65% and the earlier 
Hungarian director was also changed for a Japanese one. 
The Hungarian government has decided to promote the joint 
venture by granting a series of preferences. Land upon which the 
car factory is constructed was sold to the joint venture at a price 
considerably below its market value. The joint venture will also 
enjoy a full exemption from the income tax during the first 5 years, 
after which a preferential reduced taxation will be applied. 
Furthermore, imported machines, equipment and parts used to cars 
to be exported will be exempt from import taxes while parts used 
to cars to be sold on the Hungarian market, will be subject to an 
import tax of only 5 percent. 
As the ioint venture approached completion, the government's 
support was felt less. Mr. Shinohara, general-director of the Magyar 
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Suzuki claimed that in the beginning the Hungarian government 
promised financial support to the car industry but subcontractors 
were suffering from shortage of capital. Also, the full-fledged 
import liberalization left the developing car industry without any 
protective umbrella. Therefore, in his opinion, a consequent 
industry-policy would be necessary [14]. On the other hand it 
must be mentioned that Suzuki tried to involve Hungarian 
authorities as much as possible into taking over additional (external) 
costs of the plant. One example is the infrastructure where Suzuki 
wanted the Hungarian side to build a special service road to the 
site. Or, in another case Suzuki found the local environmental 
norms as being too severe and bargained a compromise with 
Hungarians reducing thereby the costs of environment protection. 
Mr. Suzuki, Suzuki's president when visiting the Hungarian 
factory in 1993, also proposed a Japanese-style domestic market 
protection package to the Hungarian government: to increase tax 
for imported cars, to prohibit the import of used cars, to increase 
the price for gasoline with lead and to start a budget-supported 
program for exchanging cars with 2-stroke engines [l]. These 
requests contradict the free-trade, free-market principles and also 
several international agreements that were signed by the Hungarian 
government. As a compromise, Hungary prohibited the import of 
used cars being older than 6 years. 
Subcontracting, local content 
The Suzuki project requires wide cooperation with Hungarian supply 
industry. While Suzuki will provide the important engine and gear-
24(134) 
box components, within the first year of operation 50 percent of 
all work on the project - 25 percent in assembly and 25 percent in 
parts supply-was contributed by Hungary. In future years the 
Hungarian share will rise to 55-70 percent. As can be seen from 
the following draft of the value composition, the Hungarian share 
consists of two parts, that of the base assembly factory (Magyar 
Suzuki, Esztergom) and that of other subcontractors. According to 
the draft, the share of the base plant is not going to increase, 
therefore involving more subcontractors will become a crucial issue 
when increasing the total Hungarian local content (see Table 2). 
Originally about 50 Hungarian companies were targeted as 
subcontractors. During the project's realisation Suzuki had to face 
mainly two problems when trying to involve subcontractors. One 
was that the ambitious program of privatizing state companies was 
started, which generally made the legal status of enterprises unsure. 
The second was that the government struggled with aggravating 
budget deficit and thus was unable to give financial support needed 
for restructuring. Potential subcontractors need an investment in 
the range of Ft 15 to 100 million ( $ 180 thousand to 1. 2 million) 
for restructuring and modernizing in order to supply Suzuki the 
Table 2 Subcontracting as value composition of the car (%) 
1992 1993 1994 
Suzuki Japan (imports) 65 45 35 
From W-European subcontractors 5 5 10 
Hungarian share 
consisting of 
Magyar Suzuki (Esztergom) 20 25 25 
Other subcontractors 10 25 30 
Source: Magyar Suzuki. 1993 
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parts of the quality required. At the beginning Suzuki could 
contract only slightly over 20 subcontractors. According to a tender 
survey 130 companies would be able to supply parts provided they 
can obtain a restructuring injection. It is in the interests of Suzuki 
to increase the Hungarian share over 50 percent as soon as possible, 
because in this case the joint-venture-made car can be qualified as 
of Hungarian origin and can be exported to the EC thus surmount-
ing the EC's car import quota imposed on Japanese-made cars. 
Almost during one year the number of subcontractors increased to 
35 (as of October 1993), but owing to some shadows in marketing 
partly because of the increasing competition on the Hungarian 
market and partly because of the depressed western European 
markets, Suzuki does not plan at present a dramatical increase in 
the number of subcontractors. 
Several subcontracting deals are successfully running. For 
example, the Precision Instrument Factory of Eger and Showa of 
Japan signed a licence agreement to manufacture shock-absorbers. 
The Hungarian firm has bought the necessary licence and expertise 
and began production in June 1992. Bakony Works of Veszprem 
has also formed a joint venture with Suzuki to buy the licence for 
windscreen wipers and wiper motors. The Sumitomo Wiring System 
signed a technical cooperation agreement with the IMAG-factory of 
Ikarus bus factory. The Japanese partner provides the manufactur-
ing technology and helps to train the workforce. IMAG has several 
contracts with Magyar Suzuki for supplying cable harnesses and 
seat frames. In early 1993 a subcontracting joint venture of a 
larger scale was concluded. The Daikin-company, being one of the 
largest suppliers for Suzuki in Japan, established a joint venture in 
26(136) ffi39~ ffi2i3/ 
Hungary for the production of transmission compartment. The 
base capital is Y 115 million with a participation of 50% for Daikin, 
10% for Itochu and 4096 for Bakersz (a Hungarian private company). 
While at the beginning the elements will be imported, within two 
years all of them are to be produced in Hungary [9]. At present 
there are joint-ventures with altogether 18 Japanese companies [14]. 
However, the present state of affairs in subcontracting cannot 
be qualified as satisfactory. There are two reasons for this, which 
come mainly from Suzuki's approach. One is the inflexibleness of 
the cooperation of Suzuki with the Hungarian government, the 
other is the lot size problem. In the following we will go into more 
detail. 
First, as for the inflexibleness, Suzuki never disclosed its 
feasibility study to Hungarian governmental organizations. There 
was a general study made regarding the possibility of an assembly 
plant in Esztergom, but it lacked main indicators such as development 
of output, profitability, etc. No estimations were drawn up for the 
subcontracting background. Suzuki never turned to Hungarian 
officials to consult on these issues ; only before the plant's opening 
did it present a rough calculation on investment needs in order to 
upgrade subcontractors. According to information from the Ministry 
of Industry (Budapest), in order to reach a subcontracting share of 
20 percent of the car's value in 1993, a total of 25 subcontractors 
that had been suppliers for the IKARUS bus factory would need a 
total of a Ft 2. 8 billion ( $ 35 million) capital injection. Of this, Ft 
1. 8 billion would be in credits. In order to help, a special credit 
construction has been arranged with a 15 percent interest rate, 
which is only half of the usual rate. The Industrial Development 
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Bank (Budapest) informed all 25 subcontractors about the credit 
line, out of which 12 sent in their application, of which 4 remained 
after screening, the rest not being able to prove credibility. These 
latter subcontractors could either be upgraded by Suzuki through 
Japanese bank credits or by joint ventures with other Japanese 
companies. The joint venture solution would also be a good 
opportunity since a new joint venture can get the so-called job 
creating credit amounting to a maximum of Ft 100 million. (Likewise, 
when Ford's subcontractor came to Hungary in 1992, it also used 
this joint venture from and could immediately enjoy this Ft 100 
million credit line.) Therefore, efforts would be needed on Suzuki's 
side to attract other Japanese companies to boost subcontracting in 
Hungary. 
Secondly, the lot size problem was obvious from the beginning 
though, but became prominent again in the subcontracting. That is, 
the maximum output volume pegged at 50,000 cars yearly is in 
fact much lower than the generally accepted optimal level of over 
100, 000 cars. President Mr. Suzuki says, anyway, that the minimum 
is 10, 000 cars for the assembly plant in Esztergom below which 
production would be unprofitable [6]. A renowned professor from 
Hitotsubashi University means that the main reason for Suzuki's 
continuing loss is evidently the low output volume, however, as it 
was consciously set at a low level, it can not be excluded, that 
Suzuki gets a compensation from the Japanese government through 
some "behind-the-scene" arrangement. 
There are already several new parts manufacturers in Hungary 
supplying mirrors, plastic parts, wires, etc. to western European 
car makers. As they are supplying in large enough lots to be 
28(138) ffi 39 ~ ffi 2 % 
profitable, Suzuki's low volume orders are disadvantageus, and they 
cannot be combined with western European ones because of Suzuki's 
standard specifications. Only recently there seems a breakthrough 
in this problem since Suzuki finally agreed to accept Hungarian 
made parts to be supplied to other Suzuki assembly factories. 
Further, in the case of Western European carmaking, the maker 
usually helps the subcontractor by providing the initial equipment 
freely. 
Labor management 
Magyar Suzuki will inevitably contribute to employment and labor 
skill. The Suzuki factory employs 1200, almost all of which are 
inexperienced. Through subcontracting, Suzuki will generate an 
additional 17 to 18 thousand jobs in other companies. 
Quite interestingly, Suzuki assembled a totally new labor force, 
even though in Hungary there was already a skilled labor force in 
bus production and related factories. Nevertheless Suzuki took the 
harder way by bringing Hungarians to Japan for training.1 Suzuki's 
conditions for employing new laborers were [8] 
1. to hire primarily farmers's sons but not individuals with work 
1 This was also the case in the U.S. where Japanese auto manufacturers 
such as Honda and Toyota hired totally inexperienced workers at their 
facilities in Ohio and Kentucky, even though many GM employees etc. 
were available. This was usually theorized as a move by the Japanese 
companies to avoid having to retrain workers, who may have poor work 
habits, etc., or may not do things 'their way.' Also, average age was lower, 
thus they needed lower salaries for more energy (productivity) and later 
pensions. 
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experience in the automotive or machinery industry 
2. to hire mainly males in their 20's 
3. not to hire ex-communists. 
Why does Suzuki attach importance to one's values and 
behaviour rather than his knowledge and skills? According to 
Kasahara [8] "whereas knowledge or skills can be taught relatively 
easily, values or behaviour are in the realm of culture that is difficult 
to teach. Changing one's values or behaviour would also require 
extensive time and energy". 
Both managers and workers were trained in Japan for several 
months, about half of the starting staff receiving training. The 
other half is being trained successively in Japan. Trainees had to 
sign a contract with Suzuki obliging themselves to repay the train-
ing costs if they quit within 2 years. Experience showed that only 
a modest number of 15 trainees left complaining of working 
conditions. It is interesting to compare employee benefits at Suzuki 
and Hungarian Opel. Managers at Opel, both foreign and Hungarian, 
are provided with an Opel car at their disposal, while at Suzuki 
only the Japanese managers have such a car. 
Another special feature in Suzuki is the equality between blue-
collar and white-collar employees. They wear the same uniform, 
make the same morning gymnastics, dine in the same cafeteria and 
executives share the same large room with their subordinates. 
Suzuki introduced the so-called sandwich pattern in management, 
appointing alternately Hungarians and Japanese to managerial posts. 
Thus, the president was a Hungarian, the vice executive president 
Japanese, vice president of engineering Hungarian and the plant 
manager Japanese. This pattern helps the smooth adaptation to the 
30(140) 
Hungarian environment. 
There is no labor union at Suzuki. As the work council is 
merely a consultative body, the management acquired a dominantly 
powerful position. Because of the lack of an interest-harmonizing 
mechanism between management and workers, the opposition of 
workers being discontent with low wage mounted to serious 
tensions in 1993 [8]. 
Marketing 
The Suzuki agreement leaves most of the marketing respons-
ibility with the Hungarian partners. Although the joint venture 
company is given the exclusive right to sell the assembled cars 
and parts on European markets, Suzuki is required only to advise 
the venture and promote sales through its marketing network. No 
specific obligations are imposed on Suzuki. Furthermore, although 
Suzuki is required to recommend the parts made in Hungary to 
Western buyers, it is under no obligation to sell the joint venture's 
products on Western markets [5]. Probably because of such 
stipulations of the funding agreement, among Suzuki's Japanese 
management staff the engineering orientation dominates while the 
marketing side is not strong. After initial production increases, 
however, it seems probable that Suzuki will target both Eastern 
and Western markets, helping increase sales through its West-
European network. Such a change in marketing approach will also 
be necessitated by a competition on the Hungarian market which 
is stronger than Suzuki could have anticipated (see later). 
According to the project-draft, during the first two years the 
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marketing will target Hungarian consumers and only starting in 
1994, when production substantially increases, will exports be 
activized, reaching nearly 50 percent of total production by 1995 
(Table 3). 
Table 3 Production and sales (number of cars) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
-----------------------------
Production 1,000 20,000 40,000 50,000 
Sales 
in Hungary 1,000 18,000 30,000 30,000 
exports 2,000 10,000 20,000 
Source : Magyar Suzuki, 1993. 
A sign for a new sales strategy it was when in the spring of 
1993 Suzuki unexpectedly launched on the market a third new type, 
the Suzuki Sedan with the obvious aim to acquire a greater portion 
of market through type-diversification. The composition of produ-
ction according car-types is depicted in Table 4. 
Table 4 Composition of production according car-types 
(as of 1993) 
share in production 
----------------------------------------------------
Hatchback 1. 1 1 
Hatchback 1. 3 1 
Notchback (Sedan) 1. 3 1 
Source: Magyar Suzuki, 1993 
50% 
30% 
20% 
As for Eastern export markets, Suzuki set up a sales office in 
Moscow, and began exporting to Russia and Ukraina toward the 
end of 1993. Also in 1993, exports started to China, reaching a 
volume of 3000 cars by March 1995. Suzuki's main target is, how-
32(142) ffi 39 ~ ffi 2 % 
ever, the EC market. Since Hungary became already associated 
member of the EC and was granted practically tax-free imports 
for manufactured industrial goods, Suzuki can use this opportunity 
as soon as the Hungarian made share in the car exceeds 50%. 
From April 1994 Suzuki exported the first few hundred cars to Italy 
and the Netherlands [2]. That Suzuki prefers entering the EC-
market from a third country to direct export is further illustrated 
by its recent decision to export 20, 000 Marutis from its factory in 
India to the EC [11]. 
Competition 
Since the initial years when the Suzuki Project was devised, 
market conditions have changed considerably. On the one hand, 
another joint venture car factory opened production in 1992, while 
on the other several Western car makers began operating sales 
outlets. 
The other joint venture car factory is that of General Motors 
for production of Opel cars and engines. This contract was signed 
at the same time as the one with Suzuki [ 4]. General Motors in-
vested DM 80 million into an assembly factory and DM 440 million 
into an engine factory. Yearly 15,000 cars will be assembled and 
200, 000 engines manufactured (the maximum capacity is targeted 
at 400,000 engines). The cars will be sold partly in Hungary, partly 
in W estem Europe, while most of the manufactured engines will 
be exported to other Opel plants in W estem Europe for use in as-
sembly. The Hungarian supply-share is 15 percent. After a 3-month 
experimental run the joint venture started production in July 1992 
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[3]. Furthermore, the U. S. manufacturer Ford is also present on 
the Hungarian market with its car-part factory opened in April 
1992. 
The German Audi decided to set up a fully German owned 
daughter company in Gyor for the production of a new engine-
family. The total value of the investment is going to be DM 320 
million and opening is scheduled for 1994. The new factory will 
provide job for over 1, 000 Hungarians. The Hungarian government 
helped the investment by granting a full tax exemption for the first 
5 years and a 60 percent tax cut for a further 5 years period there-
after. 
In addition, in the past two to three years several Western car 
makers opened up sales agents points in Hungary, selling 1,000 to 
2, 000 cars each annually. Some of them provide consumer credit 
facilities ;to attract new customers. Now sales offices of over 20 
foreign firms are already present in Hungary [16]. 
In 1993 Suzuki's share in the Hungarian car market was 25% 
as compared with Opel's 20% share. (Of other countries with the 
Japanese firm, in India Suzuki's share was 76%, in Pakistan 66%.) 
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